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Abstract
The concept of active distribution network has emerged by the application of
new generation and storage technologies, demand flexibility, and communication
infrastructure. The main goal is to create infrastructure and algorithms to facilitate
an increased penetration of distributed energy resources, application of demand re-
sponse and storage technologies, and encourage local generation and consumption
within the distribution network. However, managing thousands of prosumers with
different requirements and objectives is a challenging task. To do so, market mech-
anisms are found to be necessary to fully exploit the potential of customers, known
as Prosumers in this new era. This paper offers an advanced retail electricity mar-
ket based on game theory for the optimal operation of home microgrids (H-MGs)
and their interoperability within active distribution networks. The proposed mar-
ket accommodates any number of retailers and prosumers incorporating different
generation sources, storage devices, retailers, and demand response resources. It
is formulated considering three different types of players, namely generator, con-
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sumer, and retailer. The optimal solution is achieved using the Nikaido-Isoda Relax-
ation Algorithm (NIRA) in a non-cooperative gaming structure. The uncertainty of
the generation and demand are also taken into account using appropriate statistical
models. A comprehensive simulation study is carried out to reveal the effectiveness
of the proposed method in lowering the market clearing price (MCP) for about 4%,
increasing H-MG responsive load consumption by a factor of two, and promoting
local generation by a factor of three. The numerical results also show the capability
of the proposed algorithm to encourage market participation and improve profit for
all participants.
Keywords: Active distribution network, retail electricity market, game theory,
Nikaido-Isoda relaxation algorithm, home microgrid, microgrid interoperability.
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Nomenclature1
Acronyms
DR demand response
DMS distribution management system
DSO distribution system operator
DER distributed energy resource
DGU dispatchable generation unit
DNO distribution network operator
EMS energy management system
ES energy storage
ES+, ES- ES during charging/ discharging mode
EV expected value
HEMS home energy management system
H-MG home microgrid
MCEMS modified conventional energy management system
MCP market clearing price
MO market operator
MT microturbine
NDU non-dispatchable unit
NIRA Nikaido-Isoda/relaxation algorithm
NRL non-responsive load
PBUC price-based unit commitment
PV photovoltaic
RLD responsive load demand
SOC state-of-charge
TGE total generated energy
TCE total consumed energy
TOAT taguchi′s orthogonal array testing
WT wind turbine
Sets and Indices
θ, β load demand curve coefficients
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aj, bj, cj coefficients of cost function of DGU in H-MG j
n/n/n′′/n number of generators/ consumers/ retailers/ H-MGs
Ns number of uncertainty scenarios
piES+ consumer’s bids for battery during charging, i.e., ES+ ($/kWh)
∆t time interval, hour
Constants
ζES efficiency of the battery
P
(.),j
, P(.),j maximum/minimum output power of (.) in H-MG j (kW)
SOC
ES,j
,
SOCES,j
maximum/minimum state-of-charge (SOC) limits of ES in H-MG j (%)
Parameters
pii
′′−
t , pi
i′′+
t offer price of retailer i
′′ at time t for selling/buying to/from H-MGs ($/kWh)
P(.),jt,s output power of resource (.) under scenario s in the H-MG j (kW)
ρ(.),jt,s probability of scenario s of resource (.) in the H-MG j
Functions
Cit, Rit, Jit cost/revenue/profit functions of generator i at time t ($) (i∈ {1, 2, · · · ,n})
CA,jt cost of producing power by (A) in H-MG j ($)
Ci′′t , Ri
′′
t , Ji
′′
t cost/revenue/profit functions of retailer i
′′ at time t ($) (i′′∈ {1, 2, · · · ,n′′})
Ji′t cost functions of consumer i′ at time t ($) (i′∈ {1, 2, · · · ,n})
piH-MG,jt offer price of H-MG j at time t ($/kWh)
EV(.),jt expected value of energy produced by (.) in H-MG j at time t
Z(x) optimum response function in NIRA
Φi pay-off function of each player i in NIRA
Ψ(x,y) Nikaido-Isoda function
Decision variables
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P
(.),j
t output power of (.) in H-MG j during the time period t (kW)
X collective strategy set
x action of each player
SOCES,jt SOC of ES in H-MG j at time t (%)
4
4
1. Introduction5
While the ever-increasing penetration of distributed renewable generation within6
distribution networks threatens reliable and secure power system operation as a7
whole, numerous opportunities are emerging which actively engage distribution8
systems and consumers in the power system operation. To exploit these new op-9
portunities, two concepts have been developed as the major enabling ideas. First,10
the prosumer concept was born in recent years [1–4] as the ability of electricity11
consumers to become an active agent in the power system′s operation through lo-12
cal generation, demand flexibility, and storage. The second concept was H-MG13
[5–11] which is supposed to host a variety of local generation, demand flexibility14
resources, and storage devices to encourage the possibility of short- or long-term15
autonomous operation of the system in severe conditions [12, 13]. Combining these16
two enabling concepts necessitates an advanced retail electricity market with new17
functionality to enable interactions around energy and ancillary services products.18
The new market structure is expected to be scalable to accommodate any number19
and type of participants, and provide the means to encourage local interactions20
among different prosumers. Additionally, it should offer a comprehensive solution21
to facilitate the exploitation of available flexibility for the benefit of large power22
systems and end-users. The proposed market should also be able to handle large23
number of players, as is likely to happen at the distribution level.24
The application of H-MG energy management systems with (e.g., [1, 3–5]) or25
without energy storage (ES) (e.g., [7–9, 14, 15]), and H-MGs interoperability (e.g.,26
[10, 11, 16]) have been investigated in numerous research papers in the past. De-27
veloping general strategies for retail market operation have also been addressed in28
[17–25]. Colored Petri net technology [21], different game theory approaches us-29
ing NIRA algorithm [22, 24], Shapely value [24, 26], and Cournot model [25] are30
among the methods which have been utilized for retail electricity market design. In31
[26], a retail market based on game theory was proposed for H-MG interoperabil-32
ity. In their proposed structure, all consuming participants were represented by a33
single player (i.e., aggregator) which does not appreciate different objectives and34
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constraints among participants and the devices. Additionally, this formulation only35
allows one retailer in the proposed market which does not cope with the reality.36
Furthermore, using Cournot equilibrium model in [26], decision making is limited37
to only quantitative variables which is not desirable. In [27], a market structure38
was proposed as a part of an economic dispatch model for H-MG interoperability.39
Two types of players, including seller H-MGs as leaders and buyer H-MGs as follow-40
ers, were introduced which essentially limits operational capability of the method.41
Moreover, the principles of Transactive Energy was used in [28–31] to develop opti-42
mal economic dispatch of H-MGs, charge optimization and optimal participation of43
electric vehicles. Only two types of players, namely electric vehicles and utility, were44
considered in [30, 31]. In [30], the cost of electric vehicles’ charging and power45
losses of the distribution network are optimized. Thus, the required functionality is46
not developed in this method for a large pool of players of different types.47
To summarize, the following shortcomings can be identified in the existing lit-48
erature related to the retail electricity market at the distribution level:49
• Lack of a general framework for analyzing and modeling players’ behavior50
in a deregulated competitive electricity market at the residential distribution51
level in [10, 15, 16, 32–35].52
• No investigation into the impact of prosumers on the economic operations of53
future residential distribution systems through probabilistic methodologies54
[18, 20, 21, 25].55
• No supply bidding mechanism for the players in the electricity market [15,56
16, 22, 24–26].57
• No MCP calculation based on the Nash equilibrium point, market bids, and58
double-sided auction in [15–17, 22, 24–26].59
• No implementation of demand response (DR) and ES in an efficient manner60
to exploit full capabilities of these resources [22, 24, 26].61
• No solution is proposed to guarantee the benefit of all players with competing62
objectives in a multiple ownership environment in [15–17, 21, 30, 31] while63
the proposed solutions in [18, 19, 25, 28, 29] do not guarantee the optimality64
of the final solution.65
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• In [15, 16, 22, 24, 26], retailers are not considered as players in the market66
for all players.67
• Interoperability of H-MGs with each other as well as retailers are not consid-68
ered in [27, 36].69
In this paper, a comprehensive retail market is developed within the realm of70
prosumers’ and active distribution networks’ era. Game theory is adopted to es-71
tablish a scalable solution where any number of players can participate in trad-72
ing energy. In order to provide a comprehensive solution, H-MG concept is imple-73
mented which accommodates local non-dispatchable/dispatchable generation units74
(NDU/DGU), ES, and responsive load demand (RLD). The proposed market struc-75
ture encourages local generation consumption. Moreover, the proposed market fa-76
cilitates interoperability of H-MGs, where excess energy of one H-MG can be stored77
or momentarily consumed in another H-MG. The optimal operation of the system78
with multiple H-MGs leads to the simultaneous optimization of H-MGs and distri-79
bution network pay-off functions. In this study, the Nikaido-Isoda/Relaxation Algo-80
rithm (NIRA) is used to solve the optimization problem based on a non-cooperative81
game. Also, the stochastic nature of load demand and renewable generation is82
considered in the proposed market.83
The major contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows:84
• Proposing an advanced electricity market for active distribution networks85
based on game-theory;86
• Handling multiple retailers which increases competition and decreases elec-87
tricity prices for the end-users;88
• Modeling interaction among non-cooperative players with competing objec-89
tives through game-theory which guarantees fairness of the market schedules90
by achieving Nash equilibrium;91
• Accommodating both DR resources and storage devices in the market opera-92
tion to achieve a comprehensive solution exploiting all flexibilities.93
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This paper is organized as follows: The concept of H-MG is developed and ex-94
plained in Section 2 while conceptual design of the proposed market is outlined95
in Section 3. Section 4 presents structure of price-based unit commitment (PBUC)96
unit for retailers participation in the proposed market. The problem formulation97
for the NIRA algorithm is given in Section 5 while the MCP calculation based on a98
double-sided auction is developed in Section 6. Simulation results and discussions99
are presented in Section 7. Finally, the paper is concluded in Section 8.100
2. H-MG Concept101
H-MG, in this paper, refers to a green building that could have generation re-102
sources, storage devices, and flexible demand, as shown in Fig. 1. Similar to conven-103
tional microgrids, green buildings are able to independently supply their required104
power to some extent [37–40]. Additionally, green buildings can represent flexi-105
bility in terms of generation, storage, and demand response, in the same way as a106
microgrid does. Also, green buildings are capable of operating in an environment107
where they can physically trade energy with other green building. As one may real-108
ize, a green building can be defined perfectly as a microgrid with similar functional-109
ity [41, 42]. Since the focus of this paper is on residential buildings, the H-MG term110
is adopted. The concept of H-MG has already been used in literature on a DC-AC111
microgrid at residential level [43–47].112
Each H-MG can have generation resources (controllable distributed energy re-113
sources (DER) and NDU), load (non-responsive load (NRL) and RLD), and ES de-114
vices. Every generation unit, DR during load reduction, and storage in discharg-115
ing mode are classified as an individual generator, while each load entity (i.e. ES116
in charging mode, NRL, and RLD) is tagged as an independent consumer. In this117
framework, each player is trying to satisfy its own objective(s), i.e., generators try118
to maximize their profit while consumers look after minimizing their operation cost.119
In a similar manner to microgrid interoperability, several H-MGs, connected to120
the same network through a market operator or similar platform, can sell their ex-121
cess energy to adjacent H-MGs or supply their power shortage through neighbours122
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instead of purchasing energy from retailers. For a microgrid to be able to do this,123
it is necessary to have an energy management system (EMS) to make decisions in124
day-ahead and real-time operation. In this paper, every H-MG is assumed to have125
a home energy management system (HEMS) which is able to send/receive signals126
to/from a market operator, as explained later in detail. HEMS could functionally be127
able to predict local load demand, renewable generation, and demand flexibility,128
and to generate scenarios for the stochastic parameters. The HEMS is physically129
connected to generation, storage, and DR resources in the H-MG to operate them130
accordingly, and to the market operator to participate in energy trading. Therefore,131
HEMS is an integral part of the H-MG concept and the proposed market mechanism132
in this paper. Another feature of H-MGs in this study is that a single H-MG can have133
both generator and consumer as players in the market. This feature is preferred134
in this study to generalize market operation and formulation for every ownership135
situation, such as when tenants of the H-MG are not the owner of the building,136
generation and storage devices. In this framework, contradictory and competing137
objectives of the players can be conveniently sought.138
3. The proposed retail market structure139
A schematic diagram of the proposed market structure is shown in Figure 2.140
The market operator (MO) is the entity who manages the retail market and its141
participants. The MO could be either a separate entity overseen by the distribution142
network operator (DNO) or the distribution management system (DMS) or a part143
of existing distribution system operator (DSO)/DMS which alternatively becomes a144
flexible DSO. In any case, the functionalities of the proposed market structure will145
remain the same. The optimum price is calculated by the MO using information146
received from buyers and sellers.147
As shown in Figure 2, multiple retailers can engage in the market by submitting148
separate sets of supply and demand bids in order to trade energy. H-MGs also149
can participate in the retail market to trade energy, and possibly ancillary service150
products. It should be noted that while HEMS only considers the benefit of a sin-151
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NDU
DGU
RLD
ES
H-MG n
GRID
NDU
NDU
DGU
RLD
ES
H-MG 1
NDU
EMS
EMS
Figure 1: Typical green building, re-defined as H-MG for the purpose of this study
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Retailer1
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...Market Operator
Proposed market structure
H‐MG1
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NRL1
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ESn NDUn
RLDn
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Figure 2: Interaction of DNO, MO and multiple H-MG within the proposed market structure
gle H-MG, the proposed market structure seeks a global solution where all players152
benefit from participation in the market. To do so, non-cooperative game theory153
is adopted in this study, which is solved repeatedly by using game theory specific154
method, i.e., NIRA. In this kind of game, players with opposing goals are seeking155
to achieve their own interests. The proposed market structure will be explained in156
the next section in detail. Each player may have to some extent (or completely) a157
contradictory pay-off function compared with others. All of them try to maximize158
their welfare by regulating their strategies. The decision of each player has effect159
on the overall MCP.160
The proposed market enables interactions among H-MGs and with retailers to161
exchange power and utilize generation resources optimally.162
For the proposed structure to work, two types of information must be commu-163
nicated from the H-MGs to the MO: 1- Specifications of each H-MG including the164
rated capacity of the existing devices, operational constraints, and cost functions165
which do not change on a daily basis. Therefore, they will be broadcast to the MO166
once they join the market, and be updated quarterly or annually or by a notice167
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from H-MG owner. 2- Dynamic information such as the day-ahead forecast of renew-168
able generation and load demand, and the availability of generators and consumers169
which have to be communicated on a daily basis. As one can appreciate, the pro-170
posed structure looks similar to the wholesale electricity market at the transmission171
level in terms of data exchange. Therefore, the required communication is relatively172
minimal in real-time. Retailers are also required to submit supply and demand bids173
for the entire day to the MO. In return, every H-MG and retailer receives optimal174
schedules from the MO for the day-ahead operation. It is worth mentioning that the175
proposed market structure could also be deployed in real-time operation with the176
same principles without any changes. Moreover, if HEMS has enough computational177
power and memory, it can locally run the proposed operation in steps 1 and 2, as178
shown in Figure 3. Otherwise, they can act as a communication channel between179
H-MG and MO, and to operate internal devices upon receiving schedules from MO.180
Interoperability of the H-MGs is yet another feature of the proposed market. When181
a H-MG comes across excess generation, after satisfying its local demand, it tends182
to sell excess power to other H-MGs or retailers in the market based on the MCP.183
Alternatively, a H-MG with power shortage can purchase the cheapest available184
energy from other H-MGs or retailers. To encourage H-MGs to participate in the185
market with more local generation, their excess power, which has not been sold to186
other H-MGs, will be purchased by retailers at the MCP [48]. This will, in turn,187
decrease electricity prices for consumers, which will be shown in the simulation188
studies. It also reduces power losses by boosting local generation and consumption.189
To further enhance the robustness of the proposed market structure against load and190
generation uncertainties, a stochastic framework for market operation is created,191
the details of which will be explained later in this section. Without loss of generality,192
day-ahead market operation is considered for the rest of the paper.193
The proposed market runs through the following steps, as shown in Figure 3:194
Step 1: The first step is to estimate the generation capacity of photovoltaic (PV)195
and wind turbine (WT) as NDUs and also NRL for the day-ahead using HEMS.196
In order to consider the inherent variability of renewable generation and load de-197
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mand, a stochastic framework is employed based on scenario generation and the198
appropriate distribution function of the random parameter. Load and solar irradi-199
ation uncertainty are modelled using a normal distribution with known mean200
and standard deviation. In addition, wind speed variability is estimated using a201
Weibull distribution for 24-hours ahead [49]. Numerous scenarios are generated for202
each uncertainty parameters. However, running this optimization for all scenarios203
is time consuming and computationally expensive. As a result, Taguchi’s orthogonal204
array testing (TOAT) method is used to reduce the number of scenarios [49],[50].205
The TOAT method selects the minimum number of scenarios while preserving the206
main statistical information of the entire dataset. More details on the stochastic207
framework of this study can be found in [49].208
Step 2: In this step, the unit commitment problem is solved for each scenario209
achieved by TOAT method in Step 1 for every H-MG. A complicated modified con-210
ventional energy management system (MCEMS) is developed by the authors to211
manage DERs, DR resources, and ES+/ES- for the entire day. Basically, a power212
management problem is solved for every time step of the day ahead. The outcome213
is the primary schedule of each generator and consumer in each scenario including214
the charge/discharge operation schedule of the ES devices, load increase/reduction215
of DR, and the amount of power shortage or excess for each time step for the next216
day. Step 2 is designed to satisfy the local load demand using onsite generation to217
the maximum possible extent; this will result in a higher system efficiency and a218
larger penetration of DERs at the distribution level. The MCEMS algorithm is fairly219
complicated; interested readers are encouraged to consult [46] for further details.220
Step 1 and 2 can be carried out either at the H-MG level using local HEMS or by the221
MO centrally. The former structure reduces communication intensity and respects222
H-MG privacy to some level. The latter, however, decreases the upfront cost of re-223
quired devices to participate in the market for each H-MG, which encourages more224
participation. In either case the proposed market mechanism will remain intact.225
Step 3: From Step 2, the shortage and excess power of each H-MG is known for ev-226
ery scenario without considering the retailers and interoperability among H-MGs. In227
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Step 3, however, a scheduling problem is solved (in the PBUC unit) in the presence228
of participating retailers and power shortage/surplus of each H-MG. As it is shown229
in Figure 3, each retailer participates in the market by submitting two separate sets230
of bids: bid-in demand for purchasing excess power from H-MGs, and bid-in supply231
for selling power to support H-MGs with power shortage. Bids are submitted in the232
form of blocks of price and energy quantity. Step 3 also determines the upper limit233
for sold/purchased power to/from each retailer while maximizing exploitation of234
the H-MG generation. Further details are given in Section 4.235
Step 4: Primary schedules from Steps 1, 2, and 3 are calculated based on local236
MCEMS operation. They do not therefore consider interoperation among the H-237
MGs, nor the global benefit of the players. Using the consumers’ and generators’238
schedules (i.e., Inp2→3,4) as well as the retailers upper limits for purchasing and239
selling energy in each scenario as the start point (i.e., Inp3→4), the NIRA algorithm240
is used to determine the global optimal schedules of the players. This is achieved241
as a Nash equilibrium considering both local and global constraints. In this step,242
stochastic optimization is formulated by solving the NIRA algorithm. To start the243
game, the expected values of the schedules from previous steps are calculated and244
utilized. The formulation for Step 4 is given in section 5.245
Step 5: The MCP is calculated in Step 5 based on the Nash equilibrium and the bids246
submitted by the players using a double-sided auction. From there, the financial247
benefit for every player in the market is obtained based on the MCP and optimal248
schedules obtained in Step 4. This step is explained in Section 6 in more detail.249
4. PBUC unit250
As explained earlier, the retailers participate in the proposed market structure251
with two sets of bids: supply and demand. In Steps 1 and 2, the shortage/excess252
energy of each H-MG is calculated without considering the retailers’ participation in253
order to promote local energy generation and utilization. In PBUC unit, the upper254
trading limit for retailers in both supplier and consumer modes is determined based255
14
Step 3:PBUC 
scheduling for 
retailers in each 
scenario
Step 4:  Calculating 
EV and Applying 
NIRA algorithm
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To H‐MGs and 
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Schedules
Figure 3: Step-by-step process of implementing the proposed market structure
on excess/shortage energy of each H-MG; this is essential for our calculations in256
Step 4. First, total energy shortage of all H-MGs is calculated. Then, the PBUC unit257
sorts the H-MGs with excess energy and retailers’ supply bids according to their258
offer prices in ascending order. In this way, either H-MGs (with excess generation)259
or retailers with lower prices will be awarded first. Energy awarded to each retailer260
in this Step will be used as the upper limit in Step 4.261
Since it is desired to purchase any extra energy from H-MGs in order to promote262
local generation, the PBUC algorithm checks through all the H-MGs with unsold263
excess energy for the entire day. The total amount of excess energy will then be264
calculated and the retailers with the highest demand bids will be sorted in ascend-265
ing order. Consequently, the retailers with highest demand price will be awarded266
to purchase power from the H-MGs with unsold excess energy. This will set a max-267
imum upper bound for the retailers’ energy demand. The two sets of upper limits268
for retailers (in supply and demand modes) will be communicated to Step 4 (i.e.,269
Inp3→4) where a NIRA algorithm is implemented to solve an optimization problem.270
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5. Problem formulation of Step 4271
In this step, the NIRA algorithm is adopted to co-optimize the pay-off function272
of each player using a central decision-making process. This is done by calculating273
the players’ Nash equilibrium using a special type of game theory known as NIRA274
[49],[51]. The final outcome of this step is the optimal dispatch of each player in275
the market by calculating the Nash equilibrium through an iterative loop. In the rest276
of this section the NIRA algorithm formulation is presented. Variables in the NIRA277
algorithm, i.e., xi, are the generation/consumption dispatch of each player. The278
initial guess, i.e., x0, for all players is selected based on the information obtained279
from Steps 2 and 3. In this regard, it is assumed that the nature of the electricity280
market is proportional to the game theory with n participants in a non-cooperative281
game. H-MG information (such as cost functions, characteristics of generation and282
consumption devices, and physical constraints), primary dispatches calculated in283
Step 2, upper limits obtained in Step 3, and retailers’ supply and demand bids are284
among the input parameters to this unit.285
This unit has two important tasks to accomplish which are formulated as two286
sub-problems: 1- maximizing Eq. (1) [49], and 2- applying the relaxation algorithm287
and updating Eq. (2) [49].288
Ψ(x,y) =
n∑
i=1
[Θi(yi|x) −Θi(x)] (1)
Z(x) = arg max
y∈X
ψ(x,y) x,Z(x) ∈ X (2)
Both tasks are followed interactively by the NIRA unit until the difference ofZ(x)289
between two consecutive iterations becomes smaller than a predefined threshold.290
The first sub-problem solution is not optimal but satisfies a Nash equilibrium. Sub-291
problem 2, on the other hand, uses the relaxation technique through a number of292
iterations to push the results to an optimal point. After the initial value definition,293
x0, it is possible to create Φi(x), i.e., the first sub-problem. Then, solutions of294
the first sub-problem gradually converge to a new stable state in the second sub-295
problem which are considered as the desired results. If values of Ψ(x,y) becomes296
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zero, no player can unilaterally improve its pay-off Φi(x). Therefore, a balanced297
(approximate) response is achieved for the electricity market clearing by following298
the global (Eq. 13) and local constraints (Eq. 14-22).299
In the following sub-sections, a mathematical formulation is presented using300
the key components in the proposed retail electricity market, namely retailers and301
H-MGs’ players consisting of generators and consumers.302
5.1. Generator303
Generation resources include DGU, NDU and ES in discharging mode. The profit304
of generator i at time t, Jit, can be expressed and maximized as follows:305306
max Jit = Rit − Cit, t ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 24}, i ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,n} (3)
where the revenue of generator i is defined as:307308
Rit = piH-MG,jt × [PDGU,jt + PNDU,jt + PES-,jt − PNRL,jt ] (4)
309
piH-MG,jt = −θ× (PNRL,jt + PRLD,jt ) + β, θ > 0 (5)
310
PNRL,jt =
Ns∑
s=1
ρ
NRL,j
t,s × PNRL,jt,s , j ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,n} (6)
In Eq. (4), the load offer price (i.e., inverse load demand curve), piH-MG,jt , is311
calculated using Eq. (5) which, for the sake of simplicity is assumed to be the same312
at any given time t; PNRL,jt is the expected value at hour t in kW which is calculated313
by multiplying the probability of each uncertainty scenario, i.e., ρNRL,jt,s , by the kW314
value of that scenario, i.e., PNRL,jt,s , according to the Eq. (6).315
Eq. (7) is total cost of generator i which consists of DGU and ES costs. The DGU316
generation cost in H-MG j has been formulated as a quadratic function in Eq. (8),317
where aj, bj and cj are the coefficients of the cost function for DGU i of H-MG j.318
Cost of ES energy is expressed by Eq. (9). For simplicity, the offer price for all the319
players in a H-MG is assumed to be the same at each time interval. Therefore, the320
following relation can be presented.321322
Cit = CDGU,jt + CES+,jt (7)
323
CDGU,jt = aj · (PDGU,jt )2 + bj · PDGU,jt + cj, aj > 0 (8)
324
CES+,jt = piES+ × PES+,jt (9)
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5.2. Consumer325
This group of players consists of RLD loads in each H-MG. The objective is to326
minimize their operation cost (exploitation cost) by managing their own dispatch-327
able loads while maintaining a certain comfort level, as follows:328329
min Ji′t = piH-MG,jt × PRLD,jt , i′ ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,n} (10)
where offered price by H-MG j is obtained from Eq. (5).330
5.3. Retailer331
This type of player represents retailers in purchasing the excess power from the332
H-MGs as well as selling power to the H-MGs with power shortage. Ji′′t is defined333
as the retailers’ profit from exchanging energy in the market at time t which has to334
be maximized:3356
max Ji′′t = Ri
′′
t − Ci
′′
t , i
′′ ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,n′′} (11)
where revenue and cost functions are:337
Ri′′t = pii
′′−
t × Pi
′′−
t , Ci
′′
t = pi
i′′+
t × Pi
′′+
t (12)
In Eq. (12), pii
′′−
t and pi
i′′+
t are offered prices by retailer i
′′.338
5.4. General Constraints339
A set of constraints are defined to respect the physical limits of the devices and340
distribution system, as follows:341
n∑
j=1
(PDGU,jt + P
NDU,j
t + P
ES-,j
t ) +
n∑
i′′=1
Pi
′′−
t )
=
n∑
j=1
(PNRL,jt + P
ES+,j
t + P
RLD,j
t ) +
n∑
i′′=1
Pi
′′+
t )
(13)
342
PDGU,j 6 PDGU,jt 6 P
DGU,j
(14)
343
0 6 PNDU,jt 6 EVNDU,jt , EVNDU,jt =
Ns∑
s=1
ρNDU,jt,s × PNDU,jt,s (15)
344
0 6 PES-,jt (P
ES+,j
t ) 6 P
ES-,j
(P
ES+,j
), ∀t (16)
345
SOCES,j 6 SOCES,jt 6 SOC
ES,j
(17)
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346
SOCES,jt+1 − SOC
ES,j
t =
(PES+,jt − P
ES-,j
t )× ∆t
ζESESES,jTot
(18)
347
0 6 PRLD,jt 6 ζ× PNRL,jt (19)
348
0 6 Pi′′−t (Pi
′′+
t ) 6 EVi
′′−
t (EV
i′′+
t ) (20)
The supply and demand balance is guaranteed using Eq. (13) at all times; Eqs. (14)349
and (15) represent operational constraints of DGU and NDU units, respectively. Re-350
newable generation limitation is enforced by Eq. (15) by using the expected value351
as the upper level. The maximum charge/discharge power of the battery is also352
modelled by Eq. (16). Eqs. (17) and (18) represent the SOC limits of the battery353
considering its round-trip efficiency, ζES. Eq. (19) defines the amount of available354
responsive load based on the total NRLs. EVi
′′+
t and EV
i′′−
t (kW) are expected355
power purchased (sold) by retailer i′′ at time t from (to) H-MGs which are calcu-356
lated by:357358
EVi
′′−
t =
Ns∑
s=1
ρi
′′−
t,s × Pi
′′−
t,s (21)
359
EVi
′′+
t =
Ns∑
s=1
ρi
′′+
t,s × Pi
′′+
t,s (22)
where ρi
′′−
t,s and ρ
i′′+
t,s are the probability of each scenario s at time t during selling360
and purchasing power.361
6. MCP Unit362
In this unit, MCP is calculated based on the schedules obtained from the Nash363
equilibrium calculation (i.e. optimum capacity of each player in the market) and364
supply and demand bids submitted by the participants using a forward market with365
a double-sided auction [52]. The forward market aggregates the supply and de-366
mand in the merit order in terms of price-quantity pairs. The quantities are optimal367
schedules obtained from Step 4, and the prices are supply and demand bids submit-368
ted by the players. As expected, the aggregated supply and demand quantity-price369
values are monotonically increasing and decreasing step-wise curves, respectively.370
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MCP will be the intersection of the aggregated supply and demand curves. Finally,371
the pay-off function will be computed for each player based on the MCP.372
7. Simulation results and discussions373
A comprehensive simulation study is carried out to evaluate the benefit of the374
proposed market for all stakeholders. Three case studies are defined as follows:375
• CASE I: Three H-MGs connected to a single retailer are simulated where376
no market mechanism exists, and every H-MG, equipped with MCEMS, is377
attempting to only minimize its operation cost. It is used as the base-case378
scheme for comparison purposes.379
• CASE II: Three H-MGs are singly connected to a single retailer under the380
proposed market structure.381
• CASE III: Three H-MGs connected to two retailers under the proposed market382
structure.383
It is assumed that every H-MG has two players including a consumer and a gen-384
erator, where both players have similar ownership. In other words, the tenants of385
each H-MG are also the owners of the devices in the H-MG. A comparison between386
CASE II and CASE III shows the effectiveness of the proposed market mechanism in387
handling multiple players and helps to quantify the benefit of having higher compe-388
tition in the market. Additionally, the goal of having three H-MGs and two retailers389
in CASE III is to provide diversity of players while keeping the size of the simulation390
studies tractable for analysis and discussions. Please note that there is no limitation391
on the number of players, including generator, consumer, and retailer.392
Each H-MG consists of a set of generation resources including WT and PV as393
NDUs, microturbine (MT) as DGU, ES, and consumers with NRL and RLD loads.394
In Figure 4(a)-(c), PV, WT, and NRL prediction, respectively, are given for the three395
H-MGs for the day ahead. It can be seen from Figure 4(c) that all three H-MGs are396
less flexible (i.e., have higher NRL) during second peak hours in the evening. PV,397
WT, and NRL prediction profiles for each H-MG and the specifications of the DERs398
have been obtained from [46], and are given in the Appendix (Section 9). Retailers’399
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Figure 4: Predicted WT, PV, NRL, and supply/demand bids of retailers profiles for the entire day-ahead
for each H-MG
supply/demand bids are also shown in Figure 4(d). In CASE II, only retailer 1 exists400
while both retailers participate in the market operation in CASE III. Without loss of401
generality, it is assumed that supply and demand bids are the same for each retailer.402
A simulation study is then carried out for all three CASES according to the defini-403
tion with the given data and parameters. In the rest of this section, the simulation404
results are presented and explained.405
Figure 5(a) shows the total generated energy (i.e., TGE) produced locally by406
the three H-MGs in a day of operation for three cases. It can be seen that TGE is407
increased for all three H-MGs from CASE I to CASE II, and from CASE II to CASE408
III. Increasing TGE from CASE II to CASE III proves that having more players in the409
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Table 1: Comparison among the different cases in terms of TGE improvement
CASE I CASE II CASE III
CASE I —- -166.3% -238.3%
CASE II 62.4% —- -27.0%
CASE III 70.4% 21.3% —-
market improves competition, resulting in larger local production. It also proves410
the effectiveness of the proposed market approach to facilitate a higher amount of411
local generation. TGE for H-MG2 in CASE III is slightly less improved compared to412
CASE II which is because of the competition in the market. The Nash equilibrium,413
obtained in CASE II and CASE III, fulfills the objectives of all players while respecting414
their constraints. Therefore, no player can increase its pay-off by unilateral changes415
of its strategy space. It means that no player has preference relative to any other416
players at the Nash equilibrium point. In Figure 5(b), TGE of each H-MG in CASE II417
and CASE III is compared with the base-case, i.e., CASE I, to quantify improvement418
caused by the proposed market structure. On average, TGE is increased 266% and419
338% in CASE II and CASE III, respectively, compared to CASE I.420
To further compare TGE in different cases, Table1 is created using the following421
equation:422
ηi,j =
TGECASEi − TGECASEj
TGECASEi
i, j ⊂ {‘CASE I’ , ‘CASE II’, ‘CASE III’} (23)
where positive values show an increase in TGE, and negative values implies a de-423
crease in TGE. It can be seen from Table 1 that the average TGE is improved from424
CASE I to CASE III. Adding only one more retailer in CASE III led to about 21%425
improvement in TGE, which is significant. This is about a 27% improvement when426
it is normalized based on CASE II.427
Total consumed energy (TCE) in the three cases and each H-MG is shown in428
Figure 6(a). It can be seen from the figure that TCE for all H-MGs is increased from429
CASE I to CASE II, and from CASE II to CASE III. This proves that the larger the430
number of players, the higher the amount of served load in the context of RLD. The431
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Table 2: Comparison among the different cases based on TCE improvement
CASE I CASE II CASE III
CASE I —- -87.5% -132.7%
CASE II 46.7% —- -24.1%
CASE III 57.0% 19.4% —-
reason is that higher competition reduces the overall cost of operation for all players432
which encourages more consumption through RLD. While the trend is almost the433
same for H-MG 1 and 3, H-MG 2 shows less improvement in served RLD in CASE III434
compared to CASE II. The reason is linked to the lower TGE improvement for H-MG435
2 in CASE III, as shown in Figure 5(a), where competition is boosted in the market436
by having two retailers. In Figure 6(b) TCE for CASE II and CASE III compared to437
CASE I for the three H-MGs. On average, it is increased by 189% and 235% in CASE438
II and CASE III, respectively. H-MG 1 has the highest improvement among existing439
H-MGs.440
Overall improvement of TCE from CASE I to CASE II and CASE III is reported441
in Table 2. Similar to TGE, the improvement is more obvious from CASE I to CASE442
II and CASE III compared to the improvement from CASE II to CASE III. Never-443
theless, CASE III shows about 19% more TCE compared to CASE II, which is quite444
significant. If CASE II is compared with CASE III, the improvement is about 24%.445
Total served RLD throughout the day of simulation is given in Table 3 for each446
H-MG in the different cases. It is clear that lower MCP and higher availability of447
local generation significantly increased the total served RLD from CASE I to CASE448
II and CASE III. This means that consumers will pay less per kWh while consuming449
more electricity, which is facilitated by the proposed market structure.450
Average battery SOC of each H-MG in the three cases is plotted in Figure. 7(a).451
It can be seen that the battery SOC is maintained at 79% level on average, which452
has significant positive impact on battery lifetime and reliability of the system oper-453
ation. The daily SOC profile for each H-MG is also shown in Figure 7(b)-(d) for all454
H-MGs. Also, it can be seen that the SOC in all cases for all H-MGs reaches to 80%455
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Figure 5: (a) TGE of three H-MGs during the 24-hour simulation in all cases, (b) CASE II and CASE III
in comparison with CASE I
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Figure 6: (a) TCE in three H-MGs during the 24-hour simulation in all cases, (b) CASE II and CASE III
compared to CASE I
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Table 3: Total RLD (kWh) for the H-MGs during the 24-hour simulation in all cases
H-MG 1 H-MG 2 H-MG 3
CASE I 15.5 12.2 10.4
CASE II 126.2 108.5 98.9
CASE III 203.0 132.8 159.2
in the early hours where battery initial SOC was set to 50%. In other words, the456
battery in all cases is charged at mid-night when the price of electricity is cheap and457
WT is generating power. Having batteries at full-charge increases the system’s over-458
all reliability and resilience with respect to sudden power shortage and unwanted459
incidents.460
The consumer’s pay-off is a function of operation cost and the purchased elec-461
tricity from other players; the result of which is shown in Figure 8(a) based on simu-462
lation studies. Daily pay-off values (aggregated for the whole day) after market set-463
tlement is given in the figure. The results consistently show an increased operational464
cost of the consumers because of higher served RLD, as shown in Figure 6(a), in465
CASE II and CASE III by the proposed market structure. It agrees with all of the466
analyses so far as well as the willingness of consumers to increase consumption467
when MCP are satisfactorily low.468
In Figure 8(b), the daily aggregated pay-off (i.e., profit) for generators are469
shown for three cases and H-MGs. It can be seen that the profit of generators in-470
creased from CASE I to CASE III for all H-MGs. The negative values of the generators471
in CASE I means that they cannot meet their NRL at all times. Therefore, they have472
to purchase energy from retailers to meet the energy shortage. Please note that the473
cost of serving NRL is formulated in generator’ utility function in Eq. 3. It in turn474
increases the profit of the single retailer in CASE I, as shown in Figure 8(c).475
The overall benefit of multiple retailers is depicted in Figure 8(c). Not surpris-476
ingly, the overall profit for the retailers is the highest in CASE I because energy477
shortage of the H-MGs in that case is only compensated by the retailer. When the478
proposed market is utilized, overall retailer pay-off is reduced by 14.4% and 11.4%479
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Figure 7: Battery operation for all cases and H-MGs: (a) daily average SOC, (b)-(d) SOC of the battery
in 24-hour simulation for all three cases.
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Figure 8: Accumulated pay-off of (a) consumers, (b) generators, and (c) retailers for each case and
H-MG in 24-hour simulation study.
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in CASE II and CASE III, respectively, compared to the base-case, i.e., CASE I. The480
retailers however received 3.5% more profit in CASE III in comparison with CASE481
II. This is the benefit of having more players in the proposed market structure where482
CASE III with eight players represents the greater competition and provides more483
benefits for every participants.484
The MCPs are shown in Figure 9 for every hour in all CASES. It can be seen485
that the highest MCP occurred in CASE I where there is not a market mechanism.486
Average MCP in CASE I, CASE II, and CASE III is 0.188, 0.1805, and 0.183, respec-487
tively, for the whole day which shows a 3.82% and 2.5% reduction in CASE II and488
CASE III compared to CASE I. It can be seen from Fig. 9 that the MCP is notice-489
ably lower for the second peak hours from 18:00 to 21:30 in all cases because of490
the price-consumption model adopted in Eq.(5). During evening peak hours, total491
RLD and NRL are relatively large. Therefore, their demand offers in the market are492
reasonably low which resulted in low MCPs during these hours. Low MCPs around493
2:30 AM to 3:30 AM occur because of offer prices and Nash Equilibrium points for494
the given profile in those hours.495
Although absolute value of MCP is the lowest in CASE II, the TCE was the highest496
in CASE III. It means that the MCP per kWh of satisfied RLD is lower in CASE III,497
which is depicted in Fig.10. An exception is in hour 20, where the MCP per unit498
of served RLD is always lower than the MCP in CASE II and significantly lower499
compared to CASE I. It consequently proves that increasing the number of play-500
ers resulted in lower MCP per unit of served RLD. It is worth mentioning that the501
amount of served RLD depends on decreasing the MCP. In fact, because of improv-502
ing competition between sellers according to increasing the number of suppliers in503
the market, the consumers prefer to increase their RLD based on proper MCP, as504
shown in Table 3. Please note that in hours 1, 7, 8, 21 to 24 of CASE I, no RLD is505
met. Therefore, they are represented by “inf” in Fig. 10.506
27
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 24
Time, hour
0.165
0.17
0.175
0.18
0.185
0.19
0.195
M
CP
, $
/kW
h
CASE I CASE II CASE III
Figure 9: Hourly MCPs in 24-hour simulation in all cases.
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 24
Time, hour
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
M
CP
 p
er
 to
ta
l R
LD
, $
/kW
h o
f R
LD
inf inf inf inf inf inf inf
CASE I CASE II CASE III
Figure 10: MCP per unit of total served RLD in all cases.
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8. Conclusion507
In this study, a centralized market structure suitable for distribution networks508
has been proposed considering the concept of H-MG. Game theory is adopted and509
the different players are formulated with competing objectives. It is shown that510
the proposed market structure provides a global optimal scheduling for exchang-511
ing power among H-MGs, while fulfilling the contradictory objectives of the various512
players. In the proposed non-cooperative structure, players are encouraged to trade513
in the local market to facilitate exploitation of the existing resources (either gener-514
ation, storage, or demand response) for the benefit of the power system operation.515
In addition, the proposed market structure is formulated to be scalable, compre-516
hensive, and less computationally-intensive.517
The numerical simulation results reveal that the proposed market empowers H-518
MG interoperability so that maximum possible load will be served locally by onsite519
generation resources. Also, it results in minimum operational cost and consequently520
maximum profit for generators. Furthermore, increasing the number of players in521
the market resulted in increased competition which eventually resulted in lower rel-522
ative MCPs for consumers (considering significant increase in the amount of served523
RLD) and a larger profit for generators.524
In future work, the authors are planning to improve market operation by inte-525
grating the possibility of coalition formation among different players. Additionally,526
physical constraints of the network, such as voltage at different locations and power527
flow through lines, will be formulated as an optimal power flow (OPF) problem.528
Furthermore, various bidding strategies by the three players will be investigated to529
quantify market efficiency and performance.530
9. Appendix531
The specifications of the simulation studies are given in Table 4. Also, Table 5532
presents the specifications of the devices in each H-MGs and the coefficients of the533
load demand prices.534
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Table 4: The input data of the proposed game structure
Input data Value in CASE III (CASE II)
number of H-MGs 3 (1)
number of retailers 2 (1)
number of players 8 (3)
Type of game static (static)
Players’ dimensions vector [4,1,4,1,4,1,2,2] ([4,1,2])
Upper bound level of players ∞ (∞)
Lower bound level of players 0 (0)
Termination tolerance 1e−5 (1e−5)
Maximum number of iterations allowed by the relaxation algorithm 150 (100)
Table 5: Rated profile of DERs
Parameter Value Symbol
ES system
Maximum ES power during dis/charging modes (kW) P
ES+
/P
ES-
0.816/3.816
Initial SOC at T (%) SOCI 50
Maximum/minimum SOC (%) SOC/ SOC 80/20
Initial stored energy in ES (kWh) EESI 1
Total capacity of ES (kWh) EESTot 2
Consumer bid by ES+ ($/kWh) piES+t 0.145
PV system
Maximum/minimum instantaneous power for PV (kW) P
PV
/ PPV 6/ 0
WT system
Maximum/minimum instantaneous power for WT (kW) P
WT
/ PWT 8/ 0.45
MT system
Maximum/minimum instantaneous power for MT (kW) P
MT
/ PMT 12/ 3.6
Coefficients of cost function of DGU
a($/kW2h) [6e−6,7e−6,8e−6]
b($/kWh) [0.01,0.015,0.013]
c($/h) 0
Load coefficients
Load demand curve coefficients
θ($/kwh) 0.001
β($/h) 0.18
Maximum coefficient of RLD related to NRL ζ 5
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